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CIVIL DEATH IN CALIFORNIA:
A CONCEPT OVERDUE FOR ITS GRAVE
INTRODUCTION
California's modern correctional theory has established reha-
bilitation of the offender as its primary goal, and uses therapeutic
and reformative concepts to treat the prisoner's needs and prob-
lems and to assist his adjustment to the environment he will en-
counter on release from custody.' Such correctional programs
ideally include positive measures designed to re-establish the indi-
vidual's dignity,2 enabling him ,to achieve a new social identity and
re-enter society with confidence and a sense of personal responsi-
bility.3 Conversely, failure to re-orient the offender often results
in his inability to integrate into non-criminal social groups, with
recidivism the inevitable result.4
Unfortunately, these modem goals clash with the reality of
California's civil death statute, embodied in sections 2600 and
2603 of the Penal Code.5 Literally a holdover from the nine-
teenth century, section 2600 operates first totally to remove an
individual's civil rights during his prison sentence.6 Although re-
1. See generally, H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 54
(1968); Moeller, Corrections and the Community: New Dimensions, 32 FED.
PROBATION 25 (June 1968). An earlier observation that prisons are intended for
rehabilitation rather than retribution was expressed as follows: ". . . men are sent
to prison as punishment rather than for punishment." W. WALLACK, G. KENDALL
& H. BRIGGS, EDUCATION WITHIN PRISON WALLS 1 (1939).
2. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 5,1-55 (1967) [herein-
after cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] for recommendations that the inmate be pro-
vided with educational, vocational, and clinical services as the first stage of re-
habilitative treatment. The report further recommends the prisoner be provided
with an opportunity to reduce the isolation inherent in his institutional setting by
allowing him exposure to the outside community. Programs such as work-release
and study-release would be utilized, with outright discharge constituting the final
stage of this rehabilitative scheme.
3. See Note, Criminals' Loss of Civil Rights, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 328, 339-
41 (1963).
4. D. GLASER, THE EFFECTrIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35
(1964).
5. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 2600, 2603 (West 1970). For a discussion of section
,2600, see notes 6-9, 26, 67, 89, 103, 120 and accompanying text supra. Section
2603 provides that persons sentenced to state prison are not
incompetent as witnesses by affidavit or deposition in a civil case or
proceeding or by affidavit or deposition or personally in a criminal
case or proceeding, or incapable of making a will, or incapable of
making and acknowledging, a sale or conveyance of property.
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970) states in relevant part: "A sentence
of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all the civil rights oj
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cent court decisions have prompted the Legislature to restore four
narrow rights to prisoners by amendment to this section,7 this lim-
ited restoration of rights is piecemeal and ineffectual because the
basic statute still operates to deny the existence to prisoners of
all other civil rights.
To remove an individual's civil rights in such a comprehen-
sive fashion, and then to expend countless dollars and man-hours
in rehabilitation efforts to persuade the prisoner that he possesses
dignity and is capable of re-entering society with confidence and
a sense of personal responsibility are irreconcilable acts based on
conflicting theories. The civil death statute is premised on the
antiquated penal concepts of retribution and total disregard for the
rights and needs of prisoners. The statute, which predated adop-
tion of the indeterminate sentence, probation and parole, and
other rehabilitative techniques in California, 8 is incompatible with
subsequent developments in correctional theory.
This comment examines the origins of civil death and its
present operation in California. It then urges the adoption in Cal-
ifornia of the specific disabilities approach, now utilized by the
the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, au-
thority, or power during such imprisonment." (emphasis added.)
7. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970) provides the following specific
rights:
(1) To inherit real or personal property.
(2) To correspond, confidentially, with any member of the State Bar,
or holder of public office, provided that the prison authorities may open
and inspect such mail to search for contraband.
(3) To own all written material produced by such person during the pe-
riod of imprisonment.
(4) To purchase, receive, and read any and all newspapers, periodicals
and books accepted for distribution by the United States Post Office.
Pursuant to the provisions of this section, prison authorities shall have
the authority to exclude obscene publications or writings, and mail con-
taining information concerning where, how, or from whom such matter
may be obtained; and any matter of a character tending to incite murder,
arson, riot, violent racism, or any other form of violence; and any mat-
ter concerning gambling or a lottery. Nothing in this section shall be
construed as limiting the right of prison authorities (i) to open and in-
spect any and all packages received by an inmate and (ii) to establish
reasonable restrictions as to the number of newspapers, magazines, and
books that the inmate may have in his cell or elsewhere in the prison
at one time.
8. Civil death existed in California prior to 1868. See note 22 infra. It
was enacted as section 2600 of the Penal Code in 1941. Probation, id. § 1203
et seq. (West Supp. 1974), was originally enacted in 1872; the indeterminate sen-
tence, id. § 1168 (West 1970) in 1917; parole, id. § 3040 et seq. (West 1970),
in 1941; accelerated prisoner discharge, id. § 3024.5 (West 1970) in 1947; and
the work furlough program, id. § 1208 (West 1970) in 1957.
9. The incompatibility of civil death has even been recognized by the Cal-
ifornia Legislature, although the legislators have not as yet changed section 2600
to reflect their findings. A recent Legislature study concluded there is no evi-
dence to prove more severe penalties deter crime more effectively than less severe
penalties. ASSEMBLY 'COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DETERRENT EF-
FECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968).
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federal government, forty of the fifty states, and most countries
with modern penal systems. The comment demonstrates how an
emphasis on specific, limited civil disabilities, rather than the
existing California approach of eliminating virtually all civil rights
at the moment of sentencing provides a superior approach to pro-
tecting prisoners' rights which is also compatible with modern cor-
rectional theory.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL DEATH' °
The imposition of civil disability as a consequence of crime
is one of man's oldest legal concepts, originating in ancient
Greece, where it was known as "infamy." The tightly knit Greek
city-states, whose people placed great importance on the rights
and consequences of citizenship, employed infamy as a retributive
penalty to punish criminals for their crimes against society. Once
convicted, criminals were prohibited from appearing in court, vot-
ing, making speeches, attending assemblies or serving in the army.
The Romans, recognizing also the deterrent impact of "in-
famy," adopted the penalty and called it "sacer," further defining
the conditions of its imposition during its spread throughout the
Empire. The Germanic tribes of Europe later absorbed the con-
cept into their own primitive penal systems, changing its name to
"outlawry" in the process. Tribal contact was responsible for the
eventual Anglo-Saxon adoption of "outlawry" in England, where
it was viewed as a form of community retaliation against the crim-
inal. The theory was that the criminal, in effect, had declared war
on the community by violating its laws, giving the latter the right
to retaliate by whatever means seemed appropriate. The rough
justice of England in the ninth century meant the criminal lost not
only all his civil and property rights, but frequently his life as well,
for he could be killed with impunity by anyone. The imposition
of civil disabilities as an additional sanction for a criminal convic-
tion became an integral part of the heavily punitive English penal
system, which emphasized retribution and deterrence as its princi-
pal method of combatting crime.
"Outlawry" eventually became known as "attainder" and at-
tached to any person who was convicted of treason or a felony,
with immediate and grave civil disability consequences. The hap-
less individual's lands and chattels were forfeited to the Crown,
and "corruption of blood" was proclaimed, resulting in a legal in-
capacity to grant property to heirs or to receive property devised
from ancestors. To further add to his difficulties, the convicted
10. This historical overview of civil death was adapted from Damaska, Ad-
verse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Removal: A Comparative Study,
59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347, 350-51 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Damaska].
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criminal was declared "civilly dead," the legal equivalent of being
physically dead, and any legal rights he would otherwise possess
were suspended.'1
Obviously not viewing a felony conviction as a matter to be
taken lightly, the American colonies borrowed from the English
common law and adopted the penalty of civil death, although for-
feiture and corruption of blood were abandoned as unacceptable.
Not long thereafter, England and continental Europe moved away
from time-tested, but brutal, methods of punishment and public
degradation,'" as the Age of Enlightenment dawned in the late
eighteenth century. Rather than continuing the old traditions of
severe punishment for transgressions, it was believed punishment
should become less severe and penal efforts be directed instead
to prevention of crime and reformation of the criminal. 18  This
laudable concept eventually resulted in the abolition of corruption
of blood and forfeiture in England' 4 and, by 1933, the abolish-
ment of civil death in Europe.II
The initial enactment of civil death statutes in America ap-
pears to have been the result of an unquestioning adoption of the
English penal system by our colonial forefathers, who continued
existing practices without evaluating or questioning the validity of
their rationale.'" Nevertheless, the Age of Enlightenment even-
tually brightened American penal sanctions as well. Its primary
effects were the novel concept of establishing the penitentiary as
11. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373-82; Ex parte Brown, 68 Cal.
176, 178, 8 P. 829, 830 (1885).
12. The death penalty was accomplished by hanging, beheading, burning at
the stake, boiling alive and mutilation of the criminal's body. Mutilations in-
cluded branding the criminal's cheek, as well as the mutilation of hands, ears,
tongue, and other body parts.
Public degradation was often designed to expose the criminal to public ridi-
cule and loss of status, for example, by making a seller of rotten fish wear a rotten
fish around his neck. Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 945 nn.23, 26, 28 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Special Project].
13. Id. at 948.
14. Corruption of Blood Act of 1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; 2 THE STATUTES RE-
VISED 596 (3d ed. 1950); The Forfeiture Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23; 8 HALs-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 179 (3d ed. 1969).
15. The Forfeiture Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23; 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES
OF ENGLAND'179 (3d ed. 1969).
Civil death was abolished in France in 1854 and in Germanic countries at
about the same time. By 1900, "civil death" per se existed nowhere in continen-
tal Europe. The only comparable civil death statute existed in Russia during Sta-
lin's rule and was abolished after his death in 1958. The worldwide trend away
from civil death was reflected in the report of the Seventh International Congress
of Criminal Law held in Athens in 1957, which said, in relevant part: "[A1II
legal consequences of conviction motivated by the sole goal of degradation should
be abolished." Loss of civil rights was also specifically mentioned by the Con-
gress. Damaska, supra note 10, at 352-54.
16. Special Project, supra note 12 at 950.
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a replacement for' public degradation 7 and a declaration that civil
death was no longer to exist in the absence of an express statute
providing for it.18  Unfortunately, this enlightenment was only
temporary, for in 1799, New York became the first state to adopt
a civil death statute for convicted felons,', followed thereafter by
other states which either passed similar statutes20 or imposed spe-
cific disabilities in their constitutions.21 By 1868, the disability
of civil death had been well-established in California,22 when the
California Supreme Court had its first opportunity to consider the
consequences of civil death in Estate of Nerac,2 a and held that
a prisoner sentenced to the state prison for a term less than life
was deemed to be civilly dead, with all of his civil rights suspended
during the term of his imprisonment.24
II. CIVIL DEATH IN CALIFORNIA
A. California's Civil Death Statute
The language of the original civil death statute continued al-
most unchanged in California for one hundred years. Under this
statute a convict was deprived of all his civil rights. For example,
he was rendered incapable of voting, of defending his interests
by lawsuit, of entering into valid contracts, or even of contesting
a divorce based on no other factor than his imprisonment. In
1968, the statute, now embodied in section 2600 of the Penal
Code, was amended to grant four specific and narrow rights to
17. During this period of history prisons were used only to confine the crimi-
nal before his trial and to detain him until he paid his fine, rather than as a means
of punishment per se. Special Project, supra note 12, at 946 n.37.
18. Estate of Nerac, 35 Cal. 392, 396, 95 Am. Dec. 111 (1868). Cf. Owens
v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888); Davis v. Laning, 85 Tex. 39, 19
S.W. 846 (1892). The same sentiment was later expressed by the California At-
torney General. 17 Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 34 (1951).
19. 1946 N.Y. LAW R.vEIioN COMM'N REP. 172-73 & n.26.
20. ALAS. STAT. §§ 11.05.070, .080 (1970); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
1653(A), (B) (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 222.010 (1962) N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW §§ 79, 79-a (McKinney Supp. 1974);
N.D. CE r. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT., tit. 21, §§ 65-66 (1958); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1974) (although civil rights during parole, probation, or
after final discharge from prison are unlimited); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 13-
6-1 to -2 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-48-35 (1967).
21. See, e.g., CONN. Co ST. art. 6, § 3 and DEL. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (right
to vote).
22. Section 145 of the Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments provided:
A sentence of imprisonment in the State Prison for a term less than life
suspends all civil rights of the person so sentenced during the term of
imprisonment, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, au-
thority, and power; and the person sentenced to such imprisonment for
life shall thereafter be deemed civilly dead.
Ch. 99, § 145 Cal. Stats. [1850] 247 (emphasis added).
23. Estate of Nerac, 35 Cal. 392, 95 Am. Dec. 111 (1868).
24. Id. at 396, 95 Am. Dec. at 112.
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convicts. 25  The changes, however, left untouched the general
preamble of section 2600 of the Penal Code: "A sentence of im-
prisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all the civil
rights of the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices
and all private trusts, authority, or power during such imprison-
ment."' 20  This passage is virtually the same as its counterpart in
the statute considered by the California Supreme Court in the
1868 case of Estate of Nerac,27 although it omits the last phrase
of the 1868 statute: "and the person sentenced to such imprison-
ment for life shall thereafter be deemed civilly dead." Although
at first blush this semantic change seems to be an improvement
in that "civil death" is not now expressly mentioned in section
2600, the fact that imprisonment "for any term" will result in vir-
tually a total loss of civil rights gives the modern version of the
statute a "civil death" character. Furthermore, it should be noted
that the suspension of civil rights for anyone sentenced to life im-
prisonment and never granted parole will result in a permanent
"suspension" of civil rights, akin to actual civil death. That the
equivalent of civil death still exists is borne out by the title of
Chapter 3 of the Penal Code: "Civil Death of Prisoners" and in
section 2603, entitled: "Effect of Civil Death on Competency as
a Witness, Capacity to Make Will or Conveyance of Property.
28
Nomenclature and semantics aside, the initial impact of sec-
tion 2600 is first to remove all civil rights of the prisoner upon
sentencing, -then specifically to restore only four enumerated
rights20 during the time the sentence is served. The Adult Au-
thority is vested with the discretionary power to restore a prisoner's
rights during the term of imprisonment with certain exceptions. 80
The sentencing judge has similar power to restore certain civil
rights to the prisoner during the interval between the time sen-
tence is pronounced and the time the prisoner commences his im-
prisonment.
Apparently accepting these restoration provisions at face
value, the California Supreme Court stated in dicta that California
had abandoned the concept of strict "civil death," replacing it with
"statutory provisions seeking to ensure that the civil rights of those
convicted of crimes be limited only in accordance with legitimate
25. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970). See note 7 supra.
26. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
27. 35 Cal. 392, 95 Am. Dec. 111 (1868). The Act Concerning Crimes and
Punishments, ch. 99, § 145 Cal. Stats. [1850] 247.
28. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2603 (West 1970).
29. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
30. The Adult Authority and sentencing judge are prevented from restoring
the rights to act as trustee, hold public office, exercise the privilege of an elector,
or give a general power of attorney. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970).
[Vol. 15
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penal objectives."'31  This statement fails to recognize the reality
that prisoners' civil rights are not "limited," but virtually non-
existent in California, for the effect of section 2600 is still to re-
move all civil rights, except those specifically exempted, barring
restoration by special act of the Adult Authority or the sentencing
judge.
California's position on prisoners' civil rights is decidedly in
the minority. The state is one of only ten which still retain blan-
ket removal of civil rights or have a civil death statute.3 2  Most
foreign countries which possess modern penal systems have
adopted a prisoners' rights stance which is less severe than Cali-
fornia's." The world-wide trend appears to be away from the
sweeping penalty of totally eliminating civil rights upon conviction,
moving instead toward discarding, or at least limiting, the punitive
disqualifications resulting from criminal conviction. 4
It is not necessary, however, to leave California to find sup-
port for an increasingly liberal view of prisoners' rights or to ob-
serve the trend away from the disabilities of civil death. Califor-
nia's own courts have limited section 2600, although without thus-
far re-evaluating the antiquated premise underlying the statute.
Indeed, although no legislative history exists to prove the fact, the
four enumerated civil rights granted in the California civil death
statute appear to have been enacted because of case law mandat-
ing their extension to prisoners.35
31. In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 702, 470 P.2d 640, 658, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504,
522, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971).
32. The ten states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Missouri, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See note
20 supra, for statutory citations for each jurisdiction.
33. Each of the following countries imposes limits on the state's ability to
remove a convict's civil rights: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia,
Denmark, Egypt, England, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rus-
sia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. The countries of Chile and
South Korea had the same policy, although governmental repression now makes
the present status of prisoner civil rights uncertain. See generally Damaska, supra
note 10, at 352-55.
34. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and their Removal:
A Comparative Study (Part 2), 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 542, 567 (1968).
35. (1) The right to inherit real or personal property: In re Dickinson Es-
tate, 51 Cal. App. 2d 638, 125 P.2d 542 (1942). See also 16 Op. CAL. ATr'y
GEN. 131 (1950).
(2) The right to correspond confidentially with attorneys and public officials:
Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); In re Jordan, 7 Cal. 3d 930, 500 P.2d 873,
103 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1972).
(3) The right to own all written material produced during the period of im-
prisonment: In re Van Geldern, 5 Cal. 3d 832, 489 P.2d 578, 97 Cal. Rptr. 698
(1971); Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959).
(4) The qualified right to purchase, receive and read published writings:
Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969), Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d
529 (5th Cir. 1968), and Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).
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B. The Trend Among California Courts to Limit the Application
of Section 2600
California courts have viewed the civil death statute as penal
in nature, and therefore to be construed strictly 6 and not ex-
tended by implication or construction. 7  Despite older decisions
to the contrary,3 several more recent California decisions evi-
dence a movement toward recognizing the general civil rights of
prisoners. One court proclaimed in Hall v. Hall:
The trend of the law is to lessen the severity and harshness
of the common-law penalties in relation to convicts, their
property and rights; and . . . this is in accord with the
modern notion that imprisonment of a felon is rather a means
for protecting society than a punishment imposed upon an in-
dividual. 39
More recently, an appellate court stated that confinement to prison
does not strip a prisoner of all his constitutional rights.40 The ex-
istence of a residuum of legal rights for prisoners was further ac-
knowledged in Grasso v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.,
where the court proclaimed that the term "civil death" was not
to be interpreted as denoting the convict's total legal extinction.4'
The reluctance of courts in recent cases to impose civil death
has generally been expressed in three ways: (1) through a broad
reading of the existing exceptio provisions;12 (2) through the
restoration of particular civil rights;43 and (3) through the choice
of an alternate legal theory when the court's final decision might
See also In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) reacknowledging all these rights.
36. Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 271 P.2d 18, 20 (1954); Jones
v. Allen, 185 Cal. App. 2d 278, 282, 8 Cal. Rptr. 316, 319 (1960).
37. 18 Op. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 275, 278 (1951), citing Estate of Nerac, 35 Cal.
392, 95 Am. Dec. 111 (1868).
38. People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104
(1964) (holding that a prison inmate forfeits civil rights); 18 Op. CAL. A'rr'y
GEN. 275, 276 (1951) (a section 2600 decision holding that a "sentence of impris-
onment in a state prison for any term less than life suspends all the civil rights
of the person so sentenced." (emphasis added)).
39. Hall v. Hall, 98 Cal. App. 2d 209, 213, 219 P.2d 808, 811 (1950). See
also In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971).
40. Yarish v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 893, 898, 104 Cal. Rptr. 205, 209
(1972).
41. 264 Cal. App. 2d 597, 602, 70 Cal. Rptr. 458, 461 (1968).
42. Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (section 2600
could not deprive a convict of citizenship granted under the fourteenth amend-
ment); Emmanuel v. Sichofsky, 198 Cal. 713, 247 P. 205 (1926), and Coffee v.
Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 P. 482 (1899) (involuntary conveyance of property to
a creditor). See also cases cited note 35 supra.
43. Hall v. Hall, 98 Cal. App. 2d 209, 219 P.2d 808 (1950) (retroactive right
to contract); California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 200
Cal. 44, 251 P. 808 (1926) (right to contract for certain personal services).
[Vol. 15
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have been easily supported by the disabilities provided by the civil
death statute.44
It is noteworthy that the civil death statute is a creature only
of ,the state legislatures and has no analogue in the federal system.
This fact has been recognized by California courts, although they
have not commented on the inequity of a system that deprives a
California defendant of his civil rights if he goes to trial in a state
court, but not if he is tried in a federal forum within California!
Hayashi v. Lorenz45 held that the California statute was intended
to apply only to persons convicted in the courts of this state and
imprisoned in California state prisons. In the same case, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declared that the civil disabilities attendant
on the conviction and sentencing of a person in federal court for
a federal offense would be determined by federal law.46  Califor-
nia has recognized that state and federal rights are separate and
that, curiously, a person who is civilly dead under California law
may be fully possessed of his federal civil rights under the four-
teenth amendment 7 or under a federal statute such as the Civil
Rights Act. 48  As a further example of the inconsistent approach
taken by California in applying the civil death statute, the state
courts have been willing to abrogate 'the civil death disability pre-
venting the initiation of civil suits in areas where a superior statu-
44. In Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544
(1952), the supreme court disqualified the beneficiary under a life insurance pol-
icy from collecting the policy proceeds after he had murdered the insured. Al-
though the court of appeal (Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 228 P.2d 832
(1951)) had founded its denial of benefits squarely on the civil death of the now-
imprisoned beneficiary, the supreme court based its decision on principles of
equity, rather than on civil death.
45. 42 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 271 P.2d 18, 20 (1954).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., In re Jones, 57 Cal. 2d 860, 372 P.2d 310, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478
(1962).
48. See, e.g., Cancino v. Sanchez, 379 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1967); Weller v.
Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963), which up-
held civil rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981-94, prior
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-88 (1970).
The courts generally have ruled that all prisoners may invoke the provisions of
the Act since it applies to any person within the jurisdiction of the United States.
McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
The Supreme Court has held that prisoners can sue under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§' 1346(b), 2671-80 (1948), for injuries sustained while
in a federal prison. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
Note also that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a prisoner who
is a domiciliary of a non-civil death state to sue in a federal district court located
in a civil death state. Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 358 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966). This result obtains because the capacity to
sue is determined by the law of the plaintiff's domicile. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
Federal courts have also expressly held that civil death statutes apply only to sen-
tences in the state courts. E.g., Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960).
Consequently, a prisoner under a federal sentence may maintain an action in a
state like California, which has a civil death statute. Id.
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tory or sufficiently important social policy exists.49
The existing California civil death statute stands as part of
an ancient, but crumbling wall being slowly broken apart by the
steady tide of federal and state decisions which have increasingly
recognized the rights of prisoners.50 An example of a recent deci-
sion which runs counter to California's statutory position is
Procunier v. Martinez,51 which invalidated California censorship
regulations for prisoner mail. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed earlier federal court pronouncements that a prisoner "re-
tains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly,
or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."'5 2 The same
opinion recognized that the state has legitimate and substantial
concerns as to security, personal safety, institutional discipline, and
prisoner rehabilitation which are not applicable to the ordinary
community at large. The Court cautioned, however, that these
considerations do not eliminate the heavy burden the state bears
in justifying any deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights.58
An earlier appellate court decision also declared that, although a
convict may lose certain rights on entering prison, he is not entirely
bereft of all of his civil rights and does not forfeit every protection
of the law.54
49. See California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 200
Cal. 44, 251 P. 808 (1926) (workmen's compensation laws and the social policy
to compensate workmen for injuries suffered in the course and scope of their em-
ployment).
50. The following are representative of the growing body of case law and lit-
erature recognizing and dealing with prisoners' rights: Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944); Sostre v. Rockefeller,
312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.
Ala. 1966); United States ex rel. Yavis v. Shaughnessy, 112 F. Supp. 143
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights
of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669 (1966); Hirschkop & Millemann, The Un-
constitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795 (1969); Vogelman, Prison
Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386 (1968); Note, Prison-
ers' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270 (1969); Note, The Problems
of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 671
(1967); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
51. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
52. Id. at 422-23. The quoted language originated in Coffin v. Reichard, 143
F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944) and was followed for the first time by the United States
Supreme Court in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
53. 416 U.S. at 424, citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) and
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
54. Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961). See additional
federal authority in Siegel v. Ragan, 88 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. I11. 1949), aff'd,
180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990, rehearing denied, 340 U.S.
847 (1950); Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-95 (1958).
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III. THE ALTERNATIVE OF SPECIFIC DISABILITIES
The scope and increasing number of judicially granted pris-
oner rights in other jurisdictions5" raises the question why Califor-
nia-generally considered a progressive jurisdiction-continues in
the small minority of American states which still recognize the
blanket disability of civil death. Forty of the fifty states, the fed-
eral government and most foreign governments recognize, and the
overwhelming majority of the commentators 0 advocate utilizing
the alternative of specifically defined disabilities during the period
of imprisonment and parole. The imposition of specific disability
is markedly different from civil death in one crucial aspect: the
former initially assumes prisoners retain all the rights of the aver-
age citizen, selectively restricting or removing only those rights
which are incompatible with considerations of security, order, and
rehabilitation of the inmates according to the particular legitimate
governmental interest involved; civil death, on the other hand, op-
erates to remove all of the prisoners' civil rights, restoring only
a very limited number of specific rights which are themselves
limited by prison considerations of security and discipline. It is
readily apparent that the two systems are diametrically opposed
in their underlying philosophies: the imposition of specific disabil-
ities encourages rehabilitation while civil death emphasizes retri-
bution. The results produced by the two sanctions are also
markedly different. When specific disabilities are imposed, pris-
oners remain civilly "normal," except where the limitations of the
prison environment necessitate the curtailment of certain rights
and freedoms. In sharp contrast, prisoners under civil death exist
as "slaves of the state," possessing only those limited freedoms
mandated by courts seeking to restore some fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees to the grim world within the prison walls.
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has also
utilized the specific disabilities approach. In Procunier v. Marti-
55. See notes 34, 38-42, 49-50 supra.
56. For articles and comments favoring specific disabilities, see generally Bar-
kin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the
Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669, 673 (1966); Hirschkop & Millemann, The Un-
constitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 835 (1969); Vogelman,
Prison Restictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 389, 395
(1968); Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction,
23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1233-39 (1970); Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section
1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1297 (1969); Note, The Problems of Modern Penology:
Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 671, 706 (1967); Note, Crim-
inals' Loss of Civil Rights, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 328, 340 (1963); Note, Beyond
the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 523-24 (1963). For the contrary view, see Note,




nez,57 the court invalidated California's prison mail censorship
rules, which were based on the antiquated view that prisoners, be-
ing civilly dead, possessed no right to privacy in their outside cor-
respondence. Rejecting this civil death approach, the Supreme
Court allowed the censorship of prisoner mail "if it furthers one
or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order
and rehabilitation of inmates and if it [censorship] was no greater
than necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest in-
volved."5 8
The area of prisoners' civil rights has received considerable
attention from other state jurisdictions5" and from commentators
who espouse an evolution away from the outdated civil death con-
cept, seeking instead the adoption of specifically defined disabili-
ties to be imposed during the period of imprisonment. The com-
mentators generally base their endorsement of specific disabilities
on the premise that prison regulations and regimentation are in-
tended for the maintenance of order in the prison community and
not as additional punishment for the prisoners' crimes.60 A spe-
cific disabilities statute generally designates particular narrow disa-
bilities which become effective on sentencing and remain oper-
ative during the term of imprisonment, and sometimes throughout
the convict's life unless the right is restored by statutory proce-
dure. 6' A prominent example of this approach is that taken by
57. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
58. Id. at 413-14.
59. Nine states, for example, have repealed civil death statutes since 1959:
Alabama: § 1, [1965] Ala. Acts Ist Sess. 381, repealing ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 3
(1958); Idaho: ch. 143, § 5 [1971] Sess. Laws, repealing IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 18-310 to -311 (1948); Kansas: ch. 180, § 21-4701 [1969] Kan. Laws, repeal-
ing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118 (1964); Maine: ch. 276, [1959] Me. Pub. Laws,
repealing ME. REV. STAT. ch. 154, § 20 (1954); Minnesota: ch. 753, art. II, § 17
[1963] Minn. Laws, repealing MINN. STAT. § 610.34 (1961); Montana: Sec. 9,
ch. 513, [1973] Mont. Crim. Code, repealing MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-4720
to -4721 (1947); New Hampshire: ch. 289, § 2 [1967] N.H. Laws, repealing
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:8 (1955); Utah: ch. 196, § 76-10-1410 [1973]
Utah Laws, repealing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-36 to -37 (1953); Vermont: No.
83 [19631 Vt. Acts, repealing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7005 (1958).
60. See, e.g., Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life,
55 VA. L. REV. 795, 820, 837-39 (1969); Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section
1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1283-86 (1969); Note, The Problems of Modern Pe-
nology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IowA L. REV. 671, 671-72, 688,
707 (1967); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 985, 986 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506,
518-19, 535-36, 548 (1963).
61. California provides a release from "all penalties and disabilities resulting
from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted ... 9' upon satisfactory
completion of his probation, with the contingency that the prior may be pleaded
and proved in any subsequent prosecution for any other offense. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 1203.4 (West 1970).
A similar provision exists for adults convicted of misdemeanors and also to
allow the sealing of records of juvenile offenders. See CAL. PEN. CODE § §
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the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. 2  Even the
highest court of New York, the first state -to adopt a civil death
statute and, with California, one of ten states63 which have re-
tained civil death among their criminal sanctions, has stated that
any additional punishment in excess of that permitted by the judg-
ment or constitutional guarantees "should be subject to inquiry.
An individual once validly convicted . . . is not to be divested of
all rights and unalterably abandoned and forgotten by the re-
mainder of society." 4
The primary reason courts have not stepped more frequently
into the area of prisoners' rights is the traditional deference ac-
corded prison administrators in the areas of prison conduct, disci-
pline or the enforcement of prison rules and regulations.65 Judges
1203.4a, 1203.45 (West Supp. 1974). For an interesting discussion of this topic,
see Comment, The Effect of Expungement on a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL.
L. REv. 127 (1967).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 306.1-.6 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962). See, e.g., the
Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted Persons, promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (COMMISSION OF UNIFORM
STATE LAW, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAW, 295 (1964)). See also Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model
Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 608, 617-18 (1963).
63. See notes 10-20 and accompanying text supra.
64. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 174 N.E.2d 725,
726, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1961).
65. As examples of traditional federal deference, see, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis,
334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Roberts v. Pegelow,
313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); Oregon ex rel., Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d
910 (9th Cir. 1957); Ortega v. Ragan, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954); Banning
v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); Stroud
v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951); Siegel v.
Ragan, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir.
1948). For an excellent review of the "hands off" doctrine, see Note, Beyond
the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints
of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). See Bergesen & Hoerger, Judicial Miscon-
ceptions and the "Hidden Agenda" in Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 747, 754-57 (1974).
A student note dramatically outlines the scope and task of the prison admin-
istrator:
In 1965 the estimated 2.7 million serious offenses committed in this
country resulted in an average daily prison population of 425,673 in-
mates. To house this convict population, there are presently [1967]
some four hundred institutions in this country maintained solely for the
imprisonment of adult felons, and another three hundred-plus for the de-
tention of juvenile offenders. The avowed purpose of these institutions
is the isolation of the criminal for the protection of society while the
wrongdoer "pays his debt to society" and is (theoretically) rehabilitated.
These goals have proven difficult to attain. When appropriations, per-
sonnel, or facilities are inadequate, the historical view of the prison as
a place of isolation and punishment prevails, and the rehabilitative func-
tion is subordinated to the grim necessity of keeping the felon safely sep-
arated from the outside world.
Consequently, the miaximum security prison is traditionally a place
of high walls, guard towers, and quasi-military discipline. Inmates are
constantly watched, counted, and searched. There is no privacy, and the
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often felt they lacked the necessary expertise to understand the
realities and necessities of prison administration, feared judicial
entanglement in the complexities of prison disputes, or believed
the involvement of the courts might undermine the authority of
prison officials by subjecting their acts to judicial review. 66
Another cause for judicial reluctance was the opinion, held
even by members of the judiciary, that prisoners were people who
had by their own acts forfeited virtually all of their civil and human
rights."7 The courts' reluctance to become involved in redressing
prisoners' grievances has resulted in the vesting of prison officials
with broad and unquestioned authority within the walls of their
own institutions. Unfortunately, this broad authority and the lack
of effective judicial review of the performance of prison adminis-
trators has sometimes led to periodic abuses of this discretion, with
scandals and penitentiary riots the inevitable result.18
Fortunately, many courts have reconsidered their prior atti-
tude of deference to prison administrators and have begun to pro-
tect what few rights the prisoners possess. 69 Some courts have
gone even further, to declare that prisoners previously stripped by
statute of all rights nevertheless retain certain fundamental
prisoners are necessarily treated by the staff as impersonal masses, to
be numbered and marched from place to place with a minimum of fra-
ternization. The inmate's communication with relatives and friends on
the outside is heavily restricted and supervised. Punishment for minor
infractions of prison regulations is swift and severe. Escape is rare and
usually short-lived. The result is an artificial and involuntary microsoci-
ety, filled with stress and violence and unnatural relationships. The
problems of operating a penal institution with an inadequate and usually
underpaid staff in an outdated physical plant crowded (often to twice
design capacity) with felons, many of them convicted for crimes of the
most savage and brutal nature, can hardly be overemphasized. These
internal stresses, coupled with the external pressures of politics and pub-
lic opinion, make the job of the prison administrator one of the most
difficult in the world.
Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 178,
179 (1967), citing TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4, 45, 46.
66. Bergesen & Hoerger, Judicial Misconceptions and the "Hidden Agenda"
in Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 747, 775-87 (1974).
67. Characteristic of this attitude is the statement:
[The prisoner] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited
his liberty, but all his personal rights as well except those which the law
in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of
the State.
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). See also Estep
v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946) ("A felon customarily suffers the loss
of substantial rights.") where the Court cited California Penal Code section 2600;
People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1964)
("The prison inmate forfeits civil rights (Penal Code, § 2600) and, as we have
noted, is divested of a large measure of constitutional rights."); cf. Bergesen &
Hoerger, Judicial Misconceptions and the "Hidden Agenda" in Prisoners' Rights
Litigation, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 747, 756 (1974).
68. Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 178, 181 & n.14 (1967).
69. For courts which have recognized and protected prisoner rights, see note
35 supra and notes 71, 72, 74-82 infra.
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rights. 70  This new judicial attitude is manifested by an increasing
willingness to provide judicial review of prison operation and disci-
pline and thereby to safeguard the fundamental rights of the pris-
oner from the potential abuses of the prison system.
This new school of judicial activism began in 1944, when a
federal court, in Coffin v. Reichard, stated for the first time: "A
prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."71
After this decision, other courts adopted the view that the convict
remains entitled to basic constitutional guarantees,72 and that
prison administrators must be able to justify any repressive mea-
sures employed in prison operation, with the courts readily assum-
ing jurisdiction over prisoner complaints where administrative re-
view is inadequate or ineffective. 73  Courts have displayed this
new activism in almost every phase of prison administration in
order to safeguard the rights of the individual convict. They have
heard prisoner complaints involving tort claims;7 4 inadequacy of
medical treatment;75 interference with correspondence between
the prisoner, his attorney and the courts; 76 general correspondence
70. See notes 40, 41, 52, 54, supra, for citations to cases in which courts have
recognized that prisoners retain at least a minimal level of civil or constitutional
rights.
71. 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (emphasis added). This sentiment
was later echoed by the United States Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 422-23 (1974). See notes 51, 52 and accompanying text supra.
72. See cases cited in notes 69 and 70 supra. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan compared the impact of the death penalty with what he viewed as normal
prisoner rights:
An individual in prison does not lose "the right to have rights." A pris-
oner retains, for example, the constitutional rights to the free exercise
of religion, to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and to treat-
ment as a "person" for purposes of due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws. A prisoner remains a member of the human
family.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972).
73. [A] mere grant of authority cannot be taken as a blanket waiver of
responsibility in its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested
with extensive administrative responsibilities. But it does not follow that
their actions are immune from judicial review.
Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962), af'd, 374 U.S. 150
(1963). After dismissing state claims of tort immunity for prison wardens and
jailers as not persuasive, the United States Supreme Court stated the Federal Tort
Claims Act provided much-needed relief from injuries suffered by the negligence
of government employees and observed: "We should not, at the same time that
state courts are striving to mitigate the hardships caused by sovereign immunity,
narrow the remedies provided by Congress." United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S.
150, 165-66 (1963). See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 84.
74. Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962) and Winston v.
United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mu-
niz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
75. See, e.g., Hirons v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.
1965); Redding v. Pate, 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
76. Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Jordan, 7 Cal.
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to and from prisoners; 7  access to legal advice and materials; 78 and
prisoner filing of habeas corpus petitions; 71 segregation in prison;s0
discipline and punishment;8' and religious freedom 82 -all areas
which were previously off-limits to judicial scrutiny and review.
Once having recognized the existence of prisoners' rights, courts
have been willing to grant injunctive relief to protect them, 8 to
suggest the appointment of special monitors to observe prison con-
ditions,8 4 and even to give detailed orders for the operation of the
facility to correct an abuse under the Civil Rights Act. 8 The
strongest single criterion triggering involvement of the courts has
been whether the prisoner's complaint alleges deprivation of con-
stitutional rights which the court normally protects for citizens not
in prison.88
IV. POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS ON CIVIL DEATH
Just as the Constitution establishes civil rights which many
courts are not willing to extend to prisoners, it also suggests
theories under which the statutory imposition of civil death in Cali-
fornia may be attacked. The three which will be considered here
are the arguments that the penalty of civil death constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment, violates equal protection, and deprives
prisoners of their civil rights without due process of law.
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Some critics of civil death statutes argue since these statutes
are inflexible and mandatory penal sanctions, they constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, prohibited by the eighth amendment.8 7
3d 930, 500 P.2d 873, 103 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1972); In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d
1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955).
77. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
78. See generally Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 862 (1961).
79. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708 (1961); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753
(dictum), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
80. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
81. Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
988 (1967); United States ex rel. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Il1.
1964); In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1962).
82. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196
(4th Cir. 1961). See also Comment, Prisoners' Religious Freedom, 35 S. CAL.
L. REV. 162 (1962).
83. E.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
84. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1971).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972).
86. See, e.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963).
87. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
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The courts have proclaimed that the basic concept of the eighth
amendment embraces
nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . Fines, imprison-
ment and even execution may be imposed depending upon
the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the
bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally sus-
pect.88
The fact that California's version of civil death is not graduated
in severity according to the offense, but is used to remove virtually
all prisoners' rights regardless of the nature or magnitude of the
felon's crime,' increases its vulnerability to constitutional attack. 0
When it is considered that the term "felony," for which civil death
may be imposed, is defined broadly to include offenses of widely
varying seriousness, the argument that civil death is cruel and un-
usual punishment is further strengthened.91 It may be assumed
that the severity of the offense will be reflected in the length of
sentence imposed, thereby limiting the duration for which the pris-
oner's civil rights will be suspended. This assumption avoids the
otherwise valid criticism that the arbitrary and uniform deprivation
of civil rights may be totally unrelated to the nature of the crime,
and therefore cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, un-
even and somewhat arbitrary punishment is still likely because
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. The provi-
sion has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and applied to the
states. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). Robinson
invalidated as cruel and unusual punishment a California statute which imposed
a penal sanction for the "offense" of merely being addicted to the use of narcotics.
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). A similar case, however, upheld a Texas statute which
prescribed criminal punishment for the offense of being drunk in public. The
court distinguished between status and condition, saying that punishment arbitrar-
ily imposed for the former constituted cruel and unusual punishment, whereas the
latter was considered a matter over which the defendant exercised full control and
therefore could constitutionally be punishable. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
533-34 (1968). It is submitted that a comparison with civil disabilities imposed
as an automatic consequence of conviction would reveal the imposition of penal-
ties as a result of status, rather than a condition over which the convict exercises
control.
88. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); see United States ex rel. Mil-
waukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 435 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51
Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). See generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
89. "A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all
the civil rights of the person so sentenced..." CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West
1970) (emphasis added).
90. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). For the more contempo-
rary implications of Weems, see Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773 (1970); Note, Revival of the
Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme
Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996 (1964).
91. CAL. PEN. CODE § 17(a) (West 1970) defines a felony simply as an of-
fense that may be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison.
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characterization of the punishment as a felony in California is de-
termined by the sentence imposed,"2 rather than by the punish-
ment allowed by statute. Thus, one individual may be sentenced
and punished as a felon, with the attendant loss of virtually all
his civil rights, while another who committed the identical offense
may, within the discretion of the sentencing judge, be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment in the county jail, thereby acquiring
only the status of a misdemeanant." It was a similar situation
of arbitrary sentencing procedures which led the United States
Supreme Court to find the discretionary method of imposing the
death penalty to constitute cruel and unusual punishment and
therefore to be unconstitutional. 4 It is important to note that the
civil disabilities imposed on a misdemeanant are only those neces-
sitated by the needs of jail discipline and security or to enforce
the conditions of probation. 5 This same result could be obtained
through the adoption of specific disabilities for felony offenders,
thereby eliminating the problem raised herein of disparate disabid-
ities resulting from sentencing discretion.
Another example of the arbitrariness inherent in the imposi-
tion of civil death occurs when one person is convicted of a rela-
tively minor offense which nevertheless carries the designation of
"felony." The "felon" will then suffer an automatic deprivation
of virtually all of his civil rights, despite the fact that this sanction
is unrelated to the nature of his offense or to his own personal
character and potential for rehabilitation. In contrast, another in-
dividual may commit a more serious crime which is designated as
a misdemeanor with little effect on his civil rights. 0 Obviously,
92. See Special Project, supra note 12, at 954 & nn. 92-97.
93. CAL. PEN. CODE § 17(b)(l) further provides:
When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprison-
ment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail,
it is a misdemeanor for all purposes [if] . . . a judgment imposing a
punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison [is given].
94. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902
(1972).
95. Penal statutes often provide alternative penalties, allowing the sentencing
judge to exercise his discretion to view the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor
and sentence the offender in accordance with his determination. While discussing
the civil disabilities which would ensue from the discretionary sentencing of an
offender as a misdemeanant, the court in Macfarlane v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Con-
trol, 51 Cal. 2d 84, 89, 330 P.2d 769, 772 (1958) said:
[Aifter entry of the judgment imposing punishment on petitioner by im-
prisonment in the county jail, the crime of which he was convicted is
to be deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes and he is not thereafter
to be subjected to the statutory disabilities or deprivations which accom-
pany or ensue from a felony conviction.
96. The most obvious examples of disparity in punishment are evidenced by
the present felony penalties for possession of marijuana (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11357 (West Supp. 1974)), or for conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor
(CAL. PEN. CODE § 182 (West 1970)), compared with the possible misdemeanor
sentences for carrying concealed firearms (Id. § 12031 (West Supp. 1974)), ve-
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the emphasis is on the label given the particular offense, rather
than on the substantive relationship between the offense and the
social interest protected by the disability. 7  Such an emphasis
raises not only problems of cruel and unusual punishment, but
equal protection difficulties as well.
B. Equal Protection
The most easily satisfied equal protection test is simply to
find a rational relationship between the particular legislative clas-
sification and the interest the state seeks to protect."8 Even this
minimal standard makes civil death or extensive civil disabilities
suspect if it is assumed that the length of the term of imprison-
ment is intended to be commensurate with the severity of the con-
vict's offense. Certainly, no "rational relationship" can be postu-
lated to justify imposing the same degree of civil death during the
prison terms of a second offender petty thief as that imposed on
a convicted mass murderer." Similarly, a person convicted of his
first felony for offering a bribe to a bank official' should not be
under the identical civil disabilities and behavioral restraints dur-
ing his period of imprisonment as a person classified as an habitual
criminal with four separate convictions for murder, train wrecking,
burglary with explosives, and escape from a state prison by the
use of force and deadly weapons.' 0 ' These comparisons are ex-
hicular manslaughter (Id. § 192(3) (West 1970)), child molesting (ld. § 647a),
malicious libel (Id. § 249), and the first offense for one variety of counterfeiting
(ld. § 648).
97. In Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284
(1966), the California Supreme Court found a voting disability not to be viola-
tive of the eighth amendment. It reached this decision only by limiting the defi-
nition of "infamous crimes," the criterion for imposing the disability, to persons
who had been convicted of crimes evidencing a threat to the electoral process.
64 Cal. 2d at 611, 414 P.2d at 422-23, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95. The court noted
the term "felony" was overinclusive and thus deprived offenders who did not en-
danger the public interest of the fundamental right to vote. 64 Cal. 2d at 615,
414 P.2d at 425, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
98. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
99. CAL. PEN. CODE § 666 (West 1970) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, having been convicted of petit larceny or petit
theft and having served a term therefor in any penal institution or hav-
ing been imprisoned therein as a condition of probation for such offense,
commits any crime after such conviction is punishable therefor as fol-
lows: . . .
3. If the subsequent conviction is for petit theft, then the person
convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in
the county jail not exceeding one year or in the state prison not exceed-
ing five years.
100. CAL. PEN. CODE § 639 (West 1970) states in relevant part:
Every person who gives, offers, or agrees to give to any director, officer,
or employee of a financial institution any. . . money, property, or thing
of value . . . for procuring . . . for any person a loan or extension of
credit from such fnancial institution is guilty of a felony. (Emphasis
added.)
101. CAL. PEN. CODE § 644(b) (West 1970) reads:
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amples to illustrate that no justification or reasonable foundation
exists for such an astounding disparity between crime and punish-
ment! The civil death statute, which imposes on all felons an
identical loss of civil rights is an antiquated penal sanction long
overdue for review and modification. California's present statute
is merely an ineffectual effort to modernize an outmoded concept
by the cosmetic addition of those limited rights mandated by re-
cent court decisions, yet without examining the dry-rotted concep-
tual foundation underlying the statute. When the civil disabilities
imposed on ex-felons were analyzed from a similar equal protec-
tion viewpoint, a massive and exhaustive law review special
project remarked somewhat euphemistically: "It is plausible to
conclude, therefore, that even under the traditional test, these stat-
utes will be found utterly lacking in reasonableness.'
10 2
C. Due Process
Another constitutional attack on the imposition of civil death
for any felony during the period of imprisonment may be made
by examining, under due process standards, the relationship be-
tween the nature and circumstances of the crime and the varioul
rights automatically forfeited on conviction. The arbitrary pre-
sumption of disqualification to perform various civil functions,103
or the automatic imposition of broad civil disability lacking a direct
relationship to the nature of the crime should be suspect and, prior
to being imposed, should comply with recognized standards of pro-
cedural due process for the prisoner. Support for this concept is
found in the United States Supreme Court case of Heiner v.
Donnan,10 4 where the Court held that failure to give a party an
opportunity to prove the irrationality of a statutory presumption
violated the due process clause, since changing circumstances may
invalidate -the presumption or the otherwise valid premise on
which it was originally based. Further, the case of Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez,10 5 requires full due process safeguards before
Every person convicted in this state of the crime of [enumerated felonies
including escape from a state prison by use of force or dangerous or
deadly weapons] . '. . who shall have been previously three times con-
victed .. .of the crime of . . .burglary with explosives . .. murder
train wrecking . . . shall be adjudged an habitual criminal and shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life. (Emphasis
added.)
102. See Special Project, supra note 12, at 1213.
103. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970) provides in relevant part:
A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all
the civil rights of the person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices
and all private trusts, authority, or power during such imprisonment.
(Emphasis added).
104. 285 U.S. 312, 327-29 (1932); cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-
68 (1943).
105. 372 U.S. 144, 167 (1963).
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a sanction is imposed where the resulting disability constitutes
punishment. 106 Thus, if the length of sentence alone is intended
accurately to reflect the appropriate punishment for the crime,
then blanket disabilities automatically imposed on all prisoners
without a hearing to determine the validity or appropriateness of
this additional sanction may be violative of the prisoners' entitle-
ment to due process of law before those civil rights guaranteed
them by the Bill of Rights are removed.
Additionally, California's civil death statute may violate the
due process clause because it is overly broad in its elimination of
virtually all of the prisoners' fundamental rights, when compared
with the limited state interests sought to be protected.'07  As
noted earlier, the state has legitimate interests in prisoner rehabili-
tation, institutional discipline and security and in the personal
safety of those confined and employed within the state's prisons. 0 8
Yet these interests are not directly served by removing the con-
vict's right to sue to protect his property, 00 to contract for his per-
sonal needs outside the prison walls or the needs of his family,1 0
or to give personal testimony in civil trials."' By analogy,
in cases involving first amendment protections, the United States
Supreme Court has required states to accomplish their legitimate
legislative objectives by the narrowest workable means. 112  Stat-
utes which broadly stifle or eliminate fundamental liberties are in-
valid when the legislative purpose can be achieved by narrower
means less incursive upon first amendment freedoms."' Because
the Supreme Court has also applied this restrictive standard to
cases involving the due process clause in areas other than first
106. See also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961):
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the pre-
cise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action.Quoted in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970).
107. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
108. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
109. Ex parte Robinson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 626, 246 P.2d 982 (1952).
110. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 1556 (West 1954), with CAL. PEN. CODE §
2603 (West 1970).
111. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 2603 (West 1970), granting the right to give testi-
mony only in criminal trials. Cf. Application of McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531,
301 P.2d 385 (1956).
112. See Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964); Note, Power of State [sic] to Restrict One's Right to
Engage in Lawful [sic] Occupation, 25 VA. L. REV. 219 (1938); Note, Civil
Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969); Note, Less
Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
113. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (right of privacy); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v.
Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (financial privacy).
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amendment rights,"1 4 it may be argued that a similar extension
would be justified to protect the fundamental civil rights of prison-
ers.
V. THE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TEST
A rational and equitable procedure must be devised for im-
posing civil disabilities which will prevent arbitrary injustice to
convicts, yet provide adequate protection for the interests of soci-
ety which could be endangered by their behavior. A test predi-
cated on the direct or rational relationship which the convict's of-
fense and current behavior bear to the specific civil rights involved
would satisfy this requirement.
This direct relationship between removal or limitation of civil
rights and the offense committed obviously must be shown prior
to such removal or limitation."15 It has been suggested that the
determination of which civil rights must be removed or limited
could best be made at the time of sentencing, when the judge has
the offender and his record before him. 116 Assuming adequate
procedural safeguards were provided for the prisoner, it would
also seem that a subsequent determination could be made by
prison officials to reflect the prisoner's later behavior in prison and
to allow consideration of changed prison conditions and exigencies
which may permit increased exercise of his rights, or require addi-
tional limitations in response to temporary emergency conditions
within the prison.
VI. THE EFFECTS ON PAROLEES
The impact of such a modification of prisoner rights on the
parolee must also be considered. While technically still a pris-
oner, 1 T the parolee has been granted, commensurate with his re-
duced danger to society and his progress toward rehabilitation, in-
creased privileges and the freedom to serve the last portion of his
sentence outside prison walls."18 The statute covering the civil
114. The first amendment aspects of political disabilities subject these disabili-
ties to substantial overbreadth objections. Voting and the right to associate for
political reasons have been recognized as forms of political expression deserving
stringent protection. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (entitlement
to qualify for the election ballot); United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 249-
50 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966) (voting).
See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (right to employment
while holding Communist Party membership); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel).
115. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 12, at 1236.
116. Id. at 1236-37.
117. CAL. PEN. CODE, §§ 3056, 3060 (West 1970).
118. Id. § 3054.
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rights of parolees is consistent with the concept of specific disabil-
ities, for the Adult Authority may
permit paroled persons civil rights, other than the right to act
as a trustee, or hold public office, or exercise the privilege
of an elector during the term of such parole. The scope or
extent of such civil rights shall be such as, in the judgment
of the authority, is for the best interest of society and such
paroled person. 119
This section of the Penal Code is more liberal than the civil death
statute, for the parole statute simply states that all civil rights may
be granted to the parolee with certain exceptions, whereas the
Adult Authority's power to restore civil rights is preceded in the
civil death statute by the statement that "sentence of imprisonment
in a state prison for any term suspends all the civil rights of the
person so sentenced. ... 120 When a prisoner under sentence
of civil death is paroled, he maintains his prisoner status until
restoration of his rights by the Authority or completion of his pa-
role. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that section 3054 of
the Penal Code, 2' providing for parole, is equivalent to a specific
disability statute as discussed herein. The only revision of section
3054 necessary totally to achieve the status of a specific disability
statute would be to make the allowance of civil rights mandatory,
rather than permissive.
Should sections 2600 and 2603 of the Penal Code be revised
to grant all civil rights to prisoners, except those specific disabili-
ties necessitated by legitimate concerns of security, discipline,
safety and rehabilitation, and should Penal Code section 3054 be
modified to make most civil rights mandatory for parolees, the
parolee would then possess all the rights of the normal citizen,
except those which must be limited or removed to ensure proper
supervision under the terms of parole. 122  This result would be
especially appropriate for those individuals who are never sent to
prison, but placed on probation for their crimes. Any restriction
of parolee rights should obviously occur at the time probation is
granted, similar to the previous recommendation, that any limita-
tion of convict rights should occur at the time of sentencing. It
119. Id. (Emphasis added.)
120. Id. § 2600 (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 3054.
122. California courts have stated that constitutional guarantees against unlaw-
ful search and seizure generally do not apply to a parole violator because of his
technical status as a prisoner. People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150,
40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103-04 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965), and that
a search by a parole officer of a parole violator is not illegal, even though it is
made without a search warrant and without the parolee's consent. People v. Gas-
telum, 237 Cal. App. 2d 205, 208-09, 46 Cal. Rptr. 743, 745-46 (1965); cf. Peo-
ple v. Lamb, 24 Cal. App. 3d 378, 101 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1972).
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is also logical to assume that the specific disabilities imposed on
the parolee would be no greater than those encountered by that
individual during his imprisonment. Restrictions unique to the ac-
tual prison environment, such as a total lack of privacy, would be
removed or loosened since no longer necessary or directly related
to the parolee's new status123 and the professed goal of preparing
him for his eventual return to society. 124
The direct relationship test would operate, during the period
of parole, to restrict the rights of or to bar participation by the
parolee in areas directly related to his offense as long as is reason-
ably necessary for the protection of the public. Thus, an embez-
zler could be'barred from practice as a Certified Public Account-
ant; a person convicted of governmental corruption or bribery
could be denied the right to hold public office; a narcotics violator
could be prohibited from the practice of medicine; and an extor-
tionist could be denied positions of public or private trust. Con-
versely, the person convicted of petty theft would not lose his right
to vote, nor would the individual under sentence for involuntary
manslaughter lose his capacity to contract or to serve as a juror,
for neither offense demonstrates an unfitness to perform the speci-
fied civil function.
Once parole is properly completed, the individual would be-
come eligible under existing California law 5 to withdraw his plea
of guilty or nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or,
if convicted after a plea of not guilty, to have the verdict of guilty
set aside. In either case, the court would dismiss the accusations
or information against the individual, who would thereafter be re-
leased from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense
of which he was convicted.22 This restoration of rights would be
an appropriate termination of the limited restriction of rights sug-
gested herein during the term of imprisonment.
123. People v. Gilkey, 6 Cal. App. 3d 183, 187-88, 85 Cal. Rptr. 642, 645,
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1970).
124. See 67 C.J.S. Pardons, § 17 (1950) and notes thereto.
125. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1974).
126. The California Supreme Court struck down laws which prevented an ex-
convict from voting in Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 507 P.2d 1345, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 137 (1973). Ramirez, however, was subsequently reversed by the United
States Supreme Court, sub nom., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Nevertheless, the right to vote was restored to ex-felons by the voters of Cal-
ifornia when Proposition 10 was approved by a substantial margin in the election
of November 5, 1974. This restoration affects all former convicts who are no
longer in prison and who have satisfactorily completed their parole, and serves
as further evidence of public acceptance of the restoration of important rights to
ex-felons, replacing the medieval repugnance which initially led to the unfortunate




This inconsistency between California's modern penal philos-
ophy and its civil death sanction must be resolved. The Legisla-
ture must re-examine Penal Code sections 2600 and 2603 and re-
vise them to allow prisoners to retain all civil rights except those
which must be limited by the prison environment and the specific
needs for security, order and inmate rehabilitation. Such a
change would, in effect, require a balancing of the individual
rights of the prisoner and the specific needs of prison security and
discipline. The ultimate result would be a more flexible approach
to the individual offender and the nature of his crime, thereby elim-
inating the gross disparities previously discussed. 2 7
Even if a substantial number of civil rights are restored to
prisoners, the safety and security of the prison would not be im-
paired, for reasonable restrictions on mobility, as well as everyday
surveillance of prisoner activity, could be imposed in direct rela-
tion to the corresponding threat presented by the prisoner. In a
sense, California has already recognized, by its multi-level system
of prison security, that some prisoners do not require the same
amount of surveillance or restrictions on their activities as other
prisoners, and that the prisoner will often be motivated to better
his prison surroundings by improving his behavior, thereby reduc-
ing potential security and discipline problems. The maximum
security facilities of San Quentin and Folsom, the medium secu-
rity prisons in Soledad and Chino, and the minimum security cor-
rectional facilities at Jamestown and Deuel are typical examples
of the varying degree of security and levels of restrictions imposed
on prisoner activity by the California penal system.128
An important consideration, reflected by this prison system,
should be to aid prisoner rehabilitation by revising sections 2600
and 2603 of the Penal Code to reflect a philosophy compatible
with the modern goals of rehabilitation. This revision would
abolish usage of the term "civil death" in all section headings. It
would further specify that prisoners retain all of their ordinary civil
rights, except those removed under specific disabilities imposed
because of the demonstrable requirements of the prison environ-
ment. Those specific rights presently recognized by section
2600129 would be retained, together with other rights unrelated
127. See notes 93-101, and accompanying text supra. Note, however, that sec-
tion 1556 of the California Civil Code would also require appropriate amend-
ments. That section presently reads: "All persons are capable of contracting, ex-
cept minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights." (Em-
phasis added.) CAL. CIv. CODE § 1556 (West 1954).
128. Cf. Stender, The Need to Abolish "Corrections," 14 SANTA CLARA LAW.
793, 802-03 (1974).
129. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970).
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to the prisoner's offense or criminal conduct, such as the rights
to sue, to contract, and to appear in court to testify in civil matters.
Additionally, effective hearing and administrative procedures
should be specified by the Legislature to permit the imposition
of additional civil disabilities by prison authorities in direct rela-
tionship to prisoner misconduct, or to reflect valid prison circum-
stances which have changed since the original imposition of spe-
cific disabilities on the prisoner. The evolution of California's
civil disabilities law would then be complete, to the benefit of both
prisoners and the rehabilitation system. The suggested revision
would recognize in statutory form what already exists in judicial
decisions, rehabilitation philosophy, and the system of diverse cor-
rectional facilities.
Finally, the basic relevancy or purpose in automatically re-
moving prisoners' civil rights should be questioned. This com-
ment has traced the historical evolution of civil death as a punitive
and deterrent sanction in an era when heavily punitive penalties
were thought to be the only effective means of dealing with crim-
inals. Times have changed. Rehabilitation has replaced the rack
as the purpose of penal policy. Selective civil disabilities which
protect society or are directly related to the prisoner's offense are
probably valid; disabilities which effect a totally indiscriminate re-
moval of a prisoner's rights within prison largely negate efforts to
instill a sense of personal responsibility for conduct or to tailor a
correctional program to the character, intelligence and abilities of
the individual inmate. Civil disabilities which accompany the
prisoner through the prison gates and follow him as a parolee are
detriments to that individual's efforts to start a new life and to ob-
tain employment. The inevitable effect of a convict's failure to
re-integrate into society after release from prison is feeling aliena-
tion and, eventually, an increased probability of recidivism. 3
Certainly, such difficulties are not compatible with modern reha-
bilitative programs such as pre-release centers, half-way houses,
job-skill training, prison aid societies, and work-release programs.
Such disparities between the disability sanction and rehabilita-
tional objectives serve to emphasize the archaic nature of blanket
civil disabilities and their irrelevance within a modern correctional
program.
The concept of civil death as it exists in California is long
overdue for the legal graveyard. Basic prisoner rights must be
recognized, with limited restrictions imposed thereafter only as ab-
130. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM
13-35 (1964), where the author estimates that one-third of all piisoners released
from the prison system within the first two to five years following release become
recidivists.
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solutely necessary for the protection of society and efficient prison
administration. Such a change will create a more cohesive penal
and probation system, -the foundation of which is rehabilitation,
rather than retribution, and which recognizes and protects the
fundamental rights of all citizens.
Jud Scott
